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ABSTRACT
We can note three phases in the tradition of the readymade and 
appropriation since Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel of 1913. First, they 
include early enactments in which the readymade posed an onto-
logical challenge to artworks through the equation of commodity 
and art object. Second, practices in which readymades were de-
ployed semantically as lexical elements within a sculpture, paint-
ing, installation or projection. In a third phase, which most directly 
encompasses the global, the appropriation of objects, images, and 
other forms of content challenges sovereignty over the cultural and 
economic value linked to things that emerge from particular cultural 
properties ranging from Aboriginal painting in Australia to the ap-
propriation of Mao’s cult of personality in 1990s China. This essay 
considers the most recent phase of the readymade in terms of its 
century-long history.
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Readymades operate simultaneously as the appropriation of 
property and the generation of knowledge. On account of this 
duality, they afford a highly efficacious device for exploring 
postindustrial knowledge economies which are in the process 
of eclipsing manufacturing or extractive economies globally. Its 
contemporary relevance notwithstanding, however, this duality 
was present in readymades from the start. In Duchamp’s Fountain 
(1917), for instance, commentators often stress the property 
dimension: the artist’s choice is identical with his (or someone 
else’s) purchase of the readymade as property and the reassignment 
of its ownership (or authorship) to R. Mutt (or Duchamp). This shift 
remains within the terms of property, though it shifts the urinal, as 
the artwork Fountain, from a lumpen commodity to an aesthetic 
form of intellectual property. On the other hand, if knowledge is 
understood as the imposition of a stable categorization onto a thing, 
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then the readymade suspends the relationship between knowledge 
and property by superimposing two ostensibly irreconcilable 
statuses—urinal and sculpture—on the same material object. Instead 
of carrying a singular meaning then, the readymade configures 
several simultaneous and contradictory claims on meaning. We 
might say that the fixity of property is undone by the proliferation 
of cognitive properties attached to a single commodity. The true 
form of the readymade is thus not the object chosen, but rather the 
virtual configuration of epistemological claims it generates and/or 
“hosts” as projections upon it. 
Duchamp’s suspension of the urinal’s meaning in Fountain 
belongs to a European avant-garde tradition of perpetual revision 
or revolution in the definition of artworks. In fact, we might 
describe the avant-garde gesture as fundamentally a suspension of 
meaning whose epistemological effects are much more powerful 
than any mere formal innovation. But the conditions under which 
the readymade operates have changed significantly since the early 
twentieth century. With the rise of global contemporary art, the 
cognitive contradictions articulated around the readymade have 
shifted from a set of limited—even provincial—debates regarding 
the definition of modern artworks, to a geopolitical realm 
characterized by conflicts between cultures and contradictory 
models of modernity with their own epistemological bases. 
In the paintings of the Chinese artist Wang Guangyi such as 
Great Castigation Series: Coca-Cola of 1993, a socialist realist 
representation of Chinese workers can function simultaneously as 
an icon of the history of the Communist revolution, or as a token 
of nostalgia for that lost heroic period for Chinese viewers. Or, for 
international audiences, it may function as an attractive form of 
Communist kitsch equivalent in its meaning to a commodity like 
Coca-Cola to which Wang has juxtaposed them. Such works open a 
field of competing local and global claims over appropriated content 
that moves well beyond the precincts of European modernism to a 
negotiation between alternate histories of modernity: the modernity 
of Mao’s cultural revolution, for instance, versus the modernity of 
Coke’s consumer revolution. 
In order to describe these broad global strategies adequately, I 
believe it is necessary to trace a genealogy of the readymade (and 
its later appropriation) since Duchamp coined the term more than 
one hundred years ago. First, on account of its current ubiquity, 
I will contend that the readymade practice should be understood 
as a flexible “technology” rather than a punctual act of rupture 
(as historical readymades such as Fountain are often understood). 
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The closest modern analogy is therefore photography, which since 
its invention in 1839 has assumed a multiplicity of roles vis-à-vis 
traditional fine art media. Photography was positioned initially 
as a challenge to the media that preceded it (especially, in its 
superior mimetic capacities, to painting); as an alternative to the 
fine arts through its documentary and commercial manifestations; 
as a fine art medium in its own right, theorized according to 
principles of medium specificity; and finally, as the generalized 
tool that digital photography has become, which enters into many 
different types of artworks without being categorized in narrow 
terms of medium as art photography. Similarly, understood as a 
technology, the readymade and appropriation have shifted in 
their functions, while becoming as common as photography as a 
tool in global contemporary art. I will propose three dimensions 
of readymade practice, tracing them through the Euro-American 
canon in anticipation of their widespread globalization in the 90s.2 
They include: the readymade’s ontological challenges to artworks 
through its equation of commodity and art object; the semantic 
deployment of readymades as lexical elements within artworks, 
and a third cultural dimension, which most directly encompasses 
the global, wherein appropriated objects and images, generate a 
pattern of claims and counter-claims on the meaning of cultural 
property. In actuality, as has been apparent in my discussion of 
Fountain, these three dimensions are all present in the readymade 
from the beginning, but have had varying relevance at different 
historical moments and in different geopolitical contexts. In 
short, in the course of its century-long history, the readymade has 
established varying ratios between knowledge and property.
Thierry de Duve has influentially argued that in equating 
artworks with commodities Duchamp’s readymades provoked a 
shift from the conventional aesthetic question, “Is it beautiful?” to 
an ontological challenge: “Is it art?”3 The readymade suggests that 
any thing may function as an artwork if, for instance, an artist chose 
it, or a gallery or museum exhibits it. While such a fundamental 
rethinking of art’s definition has had an enormous historical and 
philosophical legacy, its disruptive force quickly wanes after the 
initial shock. By now, most participants in the art world, including 
large sections of the general public, have adopted a very permissive 
definition of artworks, which fully accepts appropriated content 
as legitimate. But the disruptive moment is only the first step in 
the readymade’s operations. While the controversy surrounding 
Fountain did of course begin with a refusal by the jury of the New York 
Independents exhibition of 1917 to ratify the work as art4, in the face 
David Joselit 160
of this refusal, Duchamp countered Fountain’s failed application 
and subsequent physical disappearance with a sustained “publicity” 
effort, spanning decades, whose purpose was to keep the work alive 
through gossip, publication, reenactment, and refabrication. Given 
the fact that this work is now an icon of modern art, such efforts 
must be considered a brilliant success. Duchamp’s readymades thus 
explore two sides of modern art’s ontological condition both as 
property and as knowledge: the artwork’s vulnerability as matter 
susceptible to time is opposed to the necessity of sustaining it 
through discourse. In other words, the standard account of the 
readymade—as a form of negation accomplished by equating an 
art object with an ordinary commodity—is only the first step in its 
operations, which in a subsequent moment calls forth a profuse 
spectacularization of the work in order to keep its image alive or, 
as De Duve has it, to put it “on the record” in the realm of knowledge.
It is this latter dynamic of publicity—or discourse—that 
opens onto the second semantic modality of the readymade in 
which commodities function as the ideologically rich language of 
consumer society. Robert Rauschenberg’s Rebus (1955) signals in its 
title what I mean by a semantic use of readymades, for a rebus is a 
sentence composed of pictures or objects—in this case readymade 
pictures drawn from various print sources. While such a grammar 
of appropriated elements was already present in Hannah Höch’s 
pioneering photomontages from 1919 onward, as well as in Meret 
Oppenheim’s or Salvador Dali’s Surrealist objects of the mid-1930s, 
it was at the mid-twentieth century, and especially in Pop art, that 
a strategy of incorporating or reproducing commercial objects 
as potent symbols as opposed to generic commodities, became 
widespread. In Andy Warhol’s work, for instance, the Campbell’s 
soup can or Coca-Cola bottle function as emblems of American 
Cold War economic power, possessing and even flaunting, qualities 
of consumer abundance through their repetition. In other words, 
their value as knowledge—or ideology—significantly overshadows 
their value as property. Warhol himself gave a brilliant, if deadpan, 
retrospective account of Coke’s supposed egalitarianism:
What’s great about this country is that America started the 
tradition where the richest consumers buy essentially the same 
things as the poorest. You can be watching TV and see Coca-
Cola, and you can know that the President drinks Coke, Liz 
Taylor drinks Coke, and just think, you can drink Coke, too. A 
Coke is a Coke and no amount of money can get you a better 
Coke than the one the bum on the corner is drinking.5 
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The same Coca-Cola that Warhol celebrates for its ideology of 
egalitarianism from an American perspective was recognized 
and critiqued as an imperialist ideology by the Brazilian artist 
Cildo Meireles. In his Insertion into Ideological Circuits of 1970, 
Meireles transferred brief messages regarding political arrests 
or disappearances under the Brazilian dictatorship, as well as the 
slogan “YANKEES GO HOME!” onto Coke bottles in the process 
of being recycled back into circulation through the prevailing 
deposit system in Brazil where used bottles are cleaned, refilled, 
and returned to the market. Because Meireles’s texts were inserted 
as though they were part of the bottle’s packaging, they were 
encountered outside of official art institutions by unsuspecting 
consumers seeking no more than to enjoy a bottle of Coke. Thus, 
while Duchamp’s readymades came into being by entering into the 
institutions of art, Meireles’s found an audience by returning to the 
circuits of ordinary commodities. 
The Coke bottle is simultaneously an advertisement for 
American commercial dominance and a political icon for those 
U.S. policies in Brazil and Latin America more broadly that abetted 
the repressive dictatorships there (as indicated by the texts that 
Meireles applies to bottles). A diagram of geopolitical power thus 
intersects—and interferes—with the circulation of a global brand. 
Ideology—which after all is a form of knowledge—engulfs property. 
Such questions of cultural property emerge in a different, 
more global fashion in the 1980s debates around appropriation 
in Australia, which exemplify the third or global stage of 
the readymade/appropriation. These complex debates were 
contentiously inter-cultural, arising from the encounter of different 
models of Aboriginal and Euro-Australian knowledge as well as 
differential positioning between a self-consciously “provincial” 
Australia and European or American art center. We can identify 
three broad positions that describe a field of diverse sovereign 
claims at stake in these debates. 
I. ABORIGINAL ARTISTS “APPROPRIATE” THEIR OWN HERITAGE. 
The inalienable rights of Aboriginal people to their ceremonial 
stories of the Dreaming (to which individual artists may claim 
access during their lifetimes) were made alienable and sold in the 
form of the Aboriginal Papunya acrylic dot painting that emerged 
in the 1970s, as well as subsequent related practices. In this work 
sacred signs or configurations that should be accessible only to 
initiates were amended to allow them to enter Anglo-Australian 
and global art markets without committing a transgression. Once 
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in circulation there, the abstraction of these paintings made them 
vulnerable to appropriation by Western aesthetic discourses, 
consequently diluting the cultural roots of the forms represented, 
or submerging them altogether within global Eurocentric art 
discourses. Aboriginal artists’ awareness and careful negotiation 
of the inalienable and alienable dimensions of ceremonial forms, 
as well as the differing contexts for their commercial and critical 
reception has been recognized as a knowing appropriation of 
traditional knowledge. Eric Michaels for instance, asserts the 
innovation involved in translating performative ritual traditions 
into contemporary painting: “These often old men and women, 
comparatively isolated in remote sites, have invented an art 
form partly by appropriating contemporary western technology 
and aesthetics, and I find it remarkable that they are denied full 
credit for extraordinary accomplishment.”6 Aboriginal painting 
is thus simultaneously a self-appropriation (of “tradition”) and an 
appropriation of the Other (through access to the Western tradition 
of abstraction)—it is a form of “property” that is deeply, if not 
always consensually, shared.
II. THE NATION APPROPRIATES ABORIGINAL CULTURE 
The Australian government itself appropriated Aboriginal forms 
as nationalist symbols, disseminating them widely in such major 
international celebrations as the Australian Bicentennial in 1988 
and the Sydney Olympics in 2000. Here Aboriginal culture is 
afforded broad spectacular exposure but not necessarily genuine 
political agency. As Tony Fry and Anne-Marie Willis declared 
in an important article of 1989, “while Aboriginal people have 
acquired a global platform for the display of their work, this 
does not constitute a platform from which to express their 
political aspirations.7 Ironically, work by Aboriginals that was 
once considered inauthentic because of its adoption of Western 
techniques and its address to a Western audience (as a kind 
of “tourist art”) was later seized upon precisely to lend a certain 
authenticity to Australian culture. But if the Australian government 
has exploited Aboriginal art to assert its values as a multi-cultural 
nation-state, following the Native Title Act of 1993 counter-claims 
were made to Aboriginal Sovereignty over traditional lands, and in 
some cases art constituting the visual transcription of ceremonial 
forms of Dreaming, analogous to those represented in Aboriginal 
painting, has been adduced as the requisite proof of continuous 
habitation in courts of law. Again, we encounter countervailing 
dynamics of appropriation: attempts by the Australian state to 
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exploit Aboriginal heritage, and Aboriginal attempts to gain title 
to traditional lands through the re-deployment of an aesthetic 
vocabulary initially developed for circulation within the Anglo-
Australian art world (and which eventually circulated globally). 
III. ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN CULTURE APPROPRIATES 
EURO-AMERICAN CULTURE. 
In the 1980s, Australia’s own geographically remote position 
vis-à-vis Euro-American art centers led to anxiety among Euro-
Australians with regard to the derivative status of their culture, 
as itself a copy, or appropriation of more geographically central 
traditions of modern and contemporary art in the Anglophone 
West. As Meaghan Morris has expressed it, “’the modern’ in 
Australia has only marginally been understood as entailing ‘the 
future’, ‘youth’, ‘originality’, ‘innovation’, rupture’, ‘the unknown’ 
and so forth. ‘The modern’ has much more commonly been 
understood as a known history, something which has already 
happened elsewhere, and which is to be reproduced, mechanically 
or otherwise with a local content.”8 Artists like Imants Tillers and 
others have exploited the notion of Australia as copy in their own 
appropriation-oriented works.
I have argued that in the ontological dimension, readymades 
generate new knowledge by suspending conventional meanings. 
In the semantic dimension, commodified material such as brands 
are combined into rebuses. And, finally, in the cultural dimension, 
the readymade may stage contradictory claims regarding 
community property. As a malleable practice that is analogous to 
photography, the readymade has remained a compelling aesthetic 
tactic throughout the 20th and 21st century precisely because it can 
manifest the different relations that knowledge establishes with-
and as-property. The readymade, it seems, is the work of art in the 
age of postindustrial production.
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